Debian-security Mailing List Threads

Minor improvement to openssl-blacklist

Fri, 16 May 2008 11:04:25 GMT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 The diff below lets one not just check the private keys - but also check the public part thereof. This is useful - as the latter can also be obtained with: openssl s_client -connect fqdn:443 -showcerts or be ran over a store, say the 'issued' store of a Certificate Authority. Dw *** openssl-vulnkey 2008-05-14 12:41:00.000000000 -0400 - --- ...

Fault in openssl-blacklist - version 0.1 -- false negatives.

Fri, 16 May 2008 11:03:21 GMT

Just FYI - there seems a minor fault in the openssl-blackist tool[1], I strongly suspect that the line: #print "bits: %s\nmodulus: %s\nkey: %s\nkey80: %s" % (bits, modulus, key, key[20:]) if key[20:] in db_lines: needs to be key = sha.sha(modulus).hexdigest() #print "bits: %s\nmodulus: %s\nkey: %s\nkey80: %s" % (bits, modulus, key, key[20:]) if key in db_lines: for the ...

Thanks to Debian OpenSSL developers

Thu, 15 May 2008 20:15:39 GMT

Hi list, I want to say: Thank you! Why? The Debian developers seems the only developers, who investigated the openssl code and not just used it. They found a strange thing in the OpenSSL Code, asked the OpenSSL people and after all, they removed the potentielly dangerous code peace. OK, this time, it was a mistake, but who but them have not just used he code for theire packages? In Germany we say: "Wer nichts ...

pr1

Thu, 15 May 2008 19:49:46 GMT

-- lpct http://www.linuxiso.cl -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-security-REQUEST with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact listmaster ...

Re: blacklist.RSA-1024 missing?

Thu, 15 May 2008 17:39:08 GMT

I was able to find blacklist.RSA-1024 in Ubuntu's openssl-blacklist package, and (fortunately) found that my 1024-bit RSA keys are in fact not blacklisted. -- http://www.doorstop.net/ ...

openssh: working exploit on bugtraq

Thu, 15 May 2008 15:38:39 GMT

http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/492112/30/0/threaded -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-security-REQUEST with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact listmaster ...

DSA-1571 and GSSAPI

Thu, 15 May 2008 13:31:36 GMT

Hi all! I was wondering how bad this actually is and it looks extremely horrible. In practice, all data transmitter over the wire for the last two years and be snooped upon (if someone has captured it - and the paranoid must assume someone has). Trusting on the security of ssh, we have, for example, used ssh to transmit data from server to server, including such sensitive information as Heimdal database master key... Am I ...

ssh-vulnkey and authorized_keys

Thu, 15 May 2008 07:52:50 GMT

Hello all, thanks for the quick response to the SSL bug and for providing ssh-vulnkey and dokuwd.pl. SSH-VULNKEY produces funny output when processing authorized_keys with additional options like from="host", command="something to do", no-agent-forwarding, etc... Instead of the file name it prints these extra options. It is hard to find such files then, especialy if they are not in regular user homes but used for ...

Re: [SECURITY] [DSA 1571-1] vulnerability of past SSH/SSL sessions

Wed, 14 May 2008 23:36:29 GMT

> Affected keys include SSH keys [...] and session keys used > in SSL/TLS connections. It seems that people are insisting quite a lot on the bad keys, but what worry me a lot more is that, apparently and very logically, past ssh connections and any SSL session keys are to be considered compromised. In other words, if a vulnerable key have been involved, and if someone was able to intercept and save the encrypted ...

DSA/DSS keys and DSA 1576-1/CVE-2008-0166.

Wed, 14 May 2008 22:41:48 GMT

There seems to be some confusion going around about the effect of the openssl issue on dsa keys. >From what I understand, when using a DSA key and the random number used to generate a signature is known, predictable, or used twice the private key can be calculated. So it seem to me that if a DSA key was ever used on a system which had that openssl version and openssl was used to generate that random number, you have to revoke ...

openssl/openssh fixes for lenny (testing)

Wed, 14 May 2008 18:02:19 GMT

Are there any plans to issue the same openssl/openssh security fixes for lenny has have been done for etch? -- Dr. Harry Edmon E-MAIL: harry 206-543-0547 harry Dept of Atmospheric Sciences FAX: 206-543-0308 University of Washington, Box 351640, Seattle, WA 98195-1640 -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-security-REQUEST with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact listmaster ...

openssl / x509 certs

Wed, 14 May 2008 17:11:19 GMT

How can I check if a rsa key created by 'openssl genrsa ...' and its x509 certificate is vulnerable ? The utility ssh-vulnkey seems to only check ssh keys. Thanks in advance ! Cheers, Philip ------------------------------------------ System Engineer Unix B | SOURCE Phone +41 44 712 65 14 Mobile +41 79 412 36 40 (for urgent cases) ------------------------------------------ -- To ...

leakage of keys?

Wed, 14 May 2008 14:17:56 GMT

Hallo, http://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys says | Additionally, some DSA keys may be compromised in the following situations: ... | * key generated with good openssl and used to ssh from a machine with bad ssl = bad Are really only DSA keys affected (i.e., RSA key generated with good openssl and used to ssh from a machine with bad ssl = good)? Does this affect other protocols? ssl/ipsec/openvpn (with certificates) ...

dowkd.pl - how the blacklist data is generated ?

Wed, 14 May 2008 12:27:45 GMT

Hi, For my understanding, the black list in the dowkd.pl is generated from the potential remaining entropy source which seems to be only the PID value added in the pool. Could we have some false negative[1] when running the dowkd script ? and would it possible to have the source code of the "black list generator" application (especially to see the endianness effect on some arch) ? Thanks a lot for any info, ...

Re: [SECURITY] [DSA 1576-1] New openssh packages fix predictable randomness

Wed, 14 May 2008 10:13:28 GMT

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Florian Weimer wrote: | ------------------------------------------------------------------------ | Debian Security Advisory DSA-1576-1 security | http://www.debian.org/security/ Florian Weimer | May 14, 2008 http://www.debian.org/security/faq | ...

dowkd.pl via Package

Wed, 14 May 2008 03:06:33 GMT

Hi, Is there any plan to provide dowkd.pl via Debian Package? I'm worried about that modified dowkd.pl, by malicious attacker, would be spread out. -- Hideki Yamane -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-security-REQUEST with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact listmaster ...

CHAO BAN

Tue, 13 May 2008 23:51:37 GMT

MOI BAN VAO XEM WEBSITE HAY www.thongtri.com -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-security-REQUEST with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact listmaster ...

Re: [SECURITY] [DSA 1571-1] New openssl packages fix predictable random number generator

Tue, 13 May 2008 13:36:59 GMT

On Tue, May 13, 2008 at 02:06:39PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote: > > (OpenPGP signature) This URL 404s (but the tool URL doesn't... possibly encouraging bad practice in running unverified code) > Instructions how to implement key rollover for various packages will be > published at: > > ...

Broken link on Debian CVE Web page (Was: [SECURITY] [DSA 1571-1] New openssl packages fix predictabl

Tue, 13 May 2008 13:32:38 GMT

On Tue, May 13, 2008 at 02:06:39PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote a message of 274 lines which said: > This is caused by an incorrect Debian-specific change to the openssl > package (CVE-2008-0166). By the way, the page has a link http://security-tracker.debian.org/, labeled "The Debian Security Tracker has the canonical list of CVE names, ...

Re: [SECURITY] [DSA 1571-1] New openssl packages fix predictablerandom number generator

Tue, 13 May 2008 13:28:04 GMT

On Tue, May 13, 2008 at 02:06:39PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote: > A detector for known weak key material will be published at: > > > > (OpenPGP signature) On stable I get "close is not a valid DB_File macro at /home/pkern/dowkd.pl line 51". Kind regards, ...